The Problem of Narrativity and Objectivity in Historical Writings，with Particular Reference to the Case of Japan by 三宅,正樹 & Masaki,MIYAKE
ISSN0387-835X 
The Bulletin 0ぱft出he
Ins路t伽 tωれeωofSoc凶 Sciences
Meiji University， Vol. 18， No. 3， 1995. 
The Problem of Narrativity and Objectivity in Historical 
Writings~ with Particular Reference to the Case of Japan 
Masaki MIYAKE 
Professor of International History 
School of Political Science and Economics 
Meiji University 
CONTENTS 
PART ONE: Historical Objectivity， Political ldeology， 
and Narrative Theory: The Case of Japan.......................... 1 
PART TWO: The Problem of Narrativity and 
Traditional Japanese Historical Writings: 
lntroductory Oral Remarks to the Session on “Fictionality， 
Narrativity， Objectivity (History and Literature， Historical Objectivity)" 
at the 18th International Congress of Historical Sciences (Montreal， 
Canada， 31August 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NOTES ......................................................... 19 
PART ONE: HistoricaI Objectivity， PoIiticaI Ideology， and Narrative 
Theory: The Case of J apan 
In 1973， the American historian Hayden White， professor at the University 
of California at Santa Cruz， published Metahistory: The Historical Imagina-
tion in Nineteenth-Century Europe .1) In this book， White stresses the narrative 
character of historicaI writings in nineteenth-century Europe. He identified 
four modes of “emplotment" in these historical writings. The four modes are: 
(1) Romantic， (2)Tragic， (3)Comic， (4)Satirical. At the same time he identifies 
four “modes of arguments，" which correspond to these four modes of emplot幽
ment. These are: (1) Formist， (2)Mechanic， (3)Conservative， and (4) Libera1.2) 
From traditionaI poetics and modern language theory， he borrows the theory 
of four “tropes": (1) Metaphor， (2) Metonymy， (3) Synecdoche， (4) Irony3) 
and classifies historicaI writings according to these four tropes. The most 
representative historians and philosophers of history in nineteenth-印刷町yEu-
rope seemed to White to be Hegel， Michelet， Ranke， Tocqueville， Burckhardt， 
Marx， Nietzsche， and Croce. 
Ranke's emplotment of history is classified by White as comic under 
the trope of synecdoche;4) his view of history is organicist， his ideology is con-
servative.4) In characterizing Ranke's works in this way， White insists that 
Ranke believed that“the highest kind of explanation to which history might 
aspire was that of a narrative description of the historicaI process."のYet
White criticizes Ranke's“objectivity" attributed to him by many admiring 
historians of nineteenth-century Germany， other European countries and the 
United States. Ranke failed， according to White， torecognize that explanation 
by narration necessari1y involved the archetypal myth or plot structure which 
alone gives form to narrative. White says: 
What Ranke did not se was that one might weIl reject a Romantic ap-
proach to history in the name of objectivity， but that， aslong as history 
was conceived to be an町-:planationby narration， one was required to bring 
to the task of narration the archetypal myth， orplot structure， by which 
alone that narrative could be given a form.6) 
What White cals the myth is not the myth of Greek gods and heroes， but 
what Aristotle cals in his Poetics muthos， namely the principle of emplot-
ment. As the French philosopher points out in the chapter “Emplotment" of 
his three-volume work Time and Narrative， Aristotle says that the muthos is 
“the organization of the events. "7) Aristotelian Poetics is identified as the art 
of “composing plots，" Ricoeur says.8) And Ricoeur chooses the French word 
“intrigue" for translating the Greek word muthos.9) We can see that both 
White and Ricoeur use the words myth or mythos in the sense of plot. 
By stressing the narrative character of history， White draws our attention 
to the affinity between history and literature， or， more specifically， between nar-
rativity in history and narrativity in literature. This focus of discussion re幽
quires us to reconsider the relation between fictiona1ity， narrativity， and objec-
tivity in history. 
In his history of American historiography discussed from the viewpoint of 
“objectivity"， That Noble Dream: The“Objectivity Question" and American 
Historical Profession， Peter Novick cal1s White “rhetorica1 relativist". He 
says: 
Though White was the central symboIic figure of what came to be designat-
ed as thenew ‘rhetorical relativism，' he was by no means the only historian 
for whom a Iiterary or Iinguistic orientation led to fundamental question-
ing of traditional objective epistemology. Some thought White's dissidence 
went a bit too far; others thought it didn't go far enough; there were those， 
like Domonick LaCapra， who thought that both were true.IO) 
Dominick LaCapra， professor ofhistory at Cornell University， isalso high幽
ly critical of what he calls “a documentary mode of historical under-stand-
ing，" 11) or“a documentary model"12)， a concept which is believed by many 
historians today to guarantee the “truth" of a historical approach. In his re-
cent work HistOlア&Criticism，加 whichhe develops this view of history， he 
a1so speaks highly of White' s book in spite of many reservations and critica1 re-
marks.13) 
The works of Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra were not accepted 
warmly by American historians. To quote Novick again， we find the following 
interesting remarks in his work That Noble Dream: 
Historians Iike White and LaCapra had， inprinciple， opened an entirely 
new dimension of ‘the objectivity question' by introducing into American 
historiography a reprocessing of influential contemporary continental 
thought. In practice， their work had Iitle positive resonance within the 
historical profession， and practica1ly none outside the subdiscipIine of Eu-
ropean intellectual history. Even within that realm， most who responded 
a血rmativelyto their work were either those professionally concerned with 
the study of contemporary figures like Foucault or Derrida， orprofessional-
ly marginal historians whose primary allegiance was to interdisciplinary 
communities with a membership made up largely of literary theorists， cul-
tural critics， and philosophers.14) 
As is well known， other historians try to establish history as a “historica1 so・
cia1 science" and attempt to establish the objectivity of history by using theo・
-2-
retical approaches borrowed from social sciences c10sely related to the field of 
history， such as sociology. 
Even so， we cannot deny the narrative character of the documentary source 
material on which historica1 discourse is based. This has been pointed out， 
among others， by the German phi1osopher Hans Michael Baumgartner of 
Munich University in his discussion on the subjectivity in history.15) 
Hayden White limits his discussions to representative historians and 
phi1osophers in nineteenth-century Europe. 1 would like to suggest here a 
widening of our scope. We should aim at a global survey of historical writings 
and inc1ude not only European and American scholars， but also， ifpossible， 
historians from other areas of civi1zations， such as India， China， and Japan. 
Such an approach would also lead to a reexamination of European historians 
such as the German historian Kar1 Lamprecht， a vehement adversary of 
Ranke， and， of European philosophers of history such as Georg Simme1. 
Ranke himself has to be discussed with particular attention. 
It will be fruitful to look back briefly upon the history of thought on histo-
ry developed in Germany during and after the lifetime of Leopold von Ranke 
in the light of the suggestions raised by White. During his lifetime， Ranke was 
criticized by the historians of the so-called “national school of history川の or
the “Prussian school" including Gustav Droysen， Heinrich von Sybel， and 
Heinrich von Treitschke. They contended that Ranke was not enthusiatic 
enough about the cause of German unification. Droysen had no intention， 
despite his increasing respect for Ranke， totolerate Ranke on two points: (1) 
Ranke was aloof from the vita1 issue of the nation， and (2) Ranke was solely 
preoccupied with Quellenkritik and the identification of facts. Droysen was 
sceptical of Ranke's search for objectivity. Droysen said that the expression 
“objective" is “contradicto in adjecto." He said that we had only one image 
of the real and this image was never objective. And， according to Friedrich 
Meinecke， this scepsis had to do with Droysen's strong ethical will.17) 
After the object of of the Prussian historians， the unification of Germany， 
was attained， a “Ranke-renaissance" began. Once the idea1 which German 
historians had sought was fulfilled， a sort of mental prostration took hold of 
them. Sybel confessed in the days of German victory over France， that with the 
attainment oftheir goal an internal vacuum had emerged. On 27 January 1871， 
he wrote:“How shall we live now? Where should we look for a new content 
for our further life?"18) Meinecke characterizes the situation with the remarks 
that the ecclesia pr，回'Saperforms interna11y more than the ecclesia triumphans.19) 
After German unification， Ranke's political quietism and solid scholarly 
method appealed to the prevailing mood among historians better than 
Treitschke's scholasticism. It was in the days of the Second German Reich that 
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Ranke's search for “objectivity" was widely accepted by German historians.20) 
Detai1ed research of the past based on a critica1 treatment of source materia1 be-
gan to flourish in Germany. 
Although Ranke was not as enthusiastic about the unification of Germany 
as were Droysen， Sybel， and Treitschke， he was not totally apolitica1. He spoke 
of “moral energy" in history， a concept which came to be great1y emphasized 
by J apanese phi1osophers and historians at the time of the Second World War. 
On the other hand， Ranke's view of history was supported by his religious 
feeling. The American historian Theodore M. von Laue said in Leopold von 
Ranke: Formative Years that， the “larger conc1usions of Ranke's 
historiography， his religious overtones and his phi1osophical ambition to grasp 
thc divine intentions of history"21) have been rejected and his “method" sur-
vived. Von Laue said that Ranke“left a large school of historians who are in 
fundamental agreement on common standards of objectivity. Academic 
historians everywhere sti1 insist upon the need for critica11y studying the most 
original sources， of penetrating al detai1s， of arriving at generalizations and 
synthesis from the primary facts. They sti1 c1ing to the ideals of objectivity and 
subordination of the historian to his materials. "2) 
The German historian， Theodor Nipperdey， stresses the fact that 
Ranke's idea of objectivity is religious. Nipperdey says that ontologically， 
epistemologica1y， and from the theory of science， God is a premiss of Ranke's 
objectivity. He asks whether Ranke's idea of objectivity can sti1 be valid in the 
“post-religious" present， when religious elements have faded away. He con-
c1udes with an affirmative answer to this question. Yet it seems to me that Nip-
perdey's question is more important than his answer.23) 
Peter Novick points out that American historians worshipped Ranke as the 
personification of scientific objectivity and that this acceptance of Ranke in 
America was based on misunderstanding. Novick says: 
The confusion in Americans' appreciation of what was meant by wissen-
schaftliche Objektivitat (scientific objectivity) was most cIearly demonstrat-
ed in their almost total misunderstanding of the man who to them embo-
died it more completely than any historian who had ever lived: Leopold 
von Ranke.24) 
Novick says that Ranke was not politica11y impartial at al and that Ranke 
was deeply convinced of the hand of God at work in history. Novick says: 
Ranke， and German historicists generally， inreaction to the French revolu-
tion， were wedded to the past， and accepted it as the basis of existing condi-
tions. Ranke's abstention from moral judgment， rather than manifesting 
disinterested neutrality， was， inits context， aprofoundly conservative polit-
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ical judgment . . . . 
He was a thoroughgoing philosophical idealist. at one with Hegel in believ-
ing the world divinely ordered. differing with him only in his insistence on 
the extent to which that order was clearly manifested in existing reality. In 
repudiating an historiography based on a priori philosophy. he promoted 
an historiography grounded on the fundamental principle that the course 
of history revealed God's work.25) 
Very similar to the acceptance of Ranke by American historians was his ac-
ceptance by Japanese historians. Ludwig Ries (1861-1928)，組町dentadmirer 
of Ranke， greatly influenced the introduction of Ranke's methodology of histo・
ry to acedemic historians in Japan. Ri回swas born in Deutsch・Krone泊 West
Prussia. He studied at Ber1in University and is reported to have assisted 
Leopold von Ranke in copying Ranke's manuscript. Riess came to Japan in 
1887 as professor of history and taught methodology of history， ancient histo-
ry， history of Germany， England， France etc. He stayed there untill902. After 
returning to Germany he became associate professor of history at Berlin Uni-
versity and published in 1912 the first volume of his methodological work 
Historik，均whichremained unfinished by his death. This volume is fi1ed with 
praise of Ranke. 
In the Japanese historica1 journa1， Shigaku Zasshi， Ries wrote for 
Japanese historians artic1es on Japan's contact with Holland， Portuga1 and Erト
gland. He once published there a short essay on Ranke in which he praised 
Ranke's discovery of new source materials， Ranke's Kritik neuerer 
Geschichtsschreiber as a model of critica1 method and his excellence in interpre-
tation of sources as well as his abi1ty at narrative description.27) In this way， 
Ranke was introduced to J apan as the undisputed master of critica1 method in 
history. The religious and ideologica1 sides seem not to have been fully per・
ceived by J apanese historians. 
Later， especia11y during the Second Wor1d War， Japanese philosophers and 
historians， most of them professors at Kyoto University， paid specia1 attention 
to Ranke's theory of “moral energy" as concentrated with the modern states. 
Most distinguished among them were three phi1osopb，ers， Koyama Iwao， Kosa圃
ka Masaaki， and Nishitani Keiji， who were al without exception devoted to 
the Japanese phi1osopher， Nishida Kitarδ， and a historian， Suzuki Shigetaka， 
who was close to Nishida. Suzuki was a1ready famous for his work Ranke to 
sekai shigaku (Ranke and the Science of Wor1d History)， 1939.28) Two of 
them， Nishitani and Suzuki， joined a symposium “Kindai no chokoku" (Over-
coming Modernity) held in July 1942. In a report presented for the symposi-
um，“My Idea of the Overcoming of Modernity，" Nishitani often refers to 
Rankean“moral energy" of the state.29) In this symposium， inrelation to the 
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problem of immutability and change in history， Suzuki refers to Ranke'.s insis-
tence that each age is directly connected with God. 30) 
Quite recently， a balanced overview of this symposium was offered by the 
J apanese philosopher， Minamoto Ryδen， former professor of Japanese in-
tellectual history at the International Christian University in Tokyo. As 
regards the characteristic of this symposium， Minamoto says as follows: 
In July 1942 a group of Japanese intellectuals was brought together by the 
magazine Literary World (Bungkukai) in symposium to discuss modern 
Western civilization and its reception in modern Japan. The papers and dis-
cussions， subsequent1y published under the tit1e Overcoming Modernity， 
present an interesting portrait of thought during wartime J apan and the po・
sition of the Kyoto schoo1.31) 
Minamoto says further: 
Ever since Takeuchi Yoshimi's critica11959 essay on the symposium，32) the 
“overcoming modernity" debate has been linked to the wel1-known 
Chuδkδron discussions on “The Wor1d-Historical Standpoint and 
J apan，' '33) but as a later revival of interest in the symposium has shown， 
the papers and discussions deserve attention on their own merits.34) 
On the idea and discussants of the symposium， Minamoto says: 
The idea for a symposium on “Overcoming Modernity" was conceived by 
Kawakami Tetsutaro， Kobayashi Hideo， and Kamei Katsuichirδ，al mem-
bers of the circle that formed around the magazine Literaη World. 
Kawakami took care of the organizationa1 details and chaired the sessions， 
while Kamei delivered a paper. All of them， along with Nakamura Mitsuo， 
Miyoshi Tatsuji， and Hayashi Fusao， took part in the discussions， which 
were held in Tokyo in July 1942. The papers were printed in the September 
and October issues of the magazine. The entire collection， including a 
paper by Nakamura and an edited transcript of the discussions， was pub-
lished in July of the following year by Sogensha of Tokyo. 
U nlike the Chuδkδ;ron debates， which dealt more with the philosophy of 
history， the “Overcoming of Modernity" symposium dealt with the nature 
of civilizations. Of the thirteen participants， only two were members of the 
Kyoto school， whereas al the participants in the Chuδkδron debates be-
longed to the Kyoto school. The two in question， Nishitani Keiji and 
Suzuki Shigetaka， were also part of the Chuδkδron discussions. 
Shimomura Toratarδ， though not a member of the Kyoto school strictly 
speaking， moved in academic circles that had ties to it. In addition to the 
six members of Literary World， other participants included Moroi Saburo， 
a music theorist and composer， Kikuchi Masashi， an atomic physicist， 
Yoshimitsu Yoshihiko， a Catholic theologian， and Tsumura Hideo， a 
movie critic. The criterion for selection of the group is not clear， but the in・
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vitations seem to have been extended to specialists who were also in some 
sense cultural critics.均
The only historian in this symposium was Suzuki Shigetaka， professor of 
European medieval history at Kyoto University. His standpoint is referred to 
by Minamoto in the following way: 
The “Memorandum on ‘Overcoming Modernity' " that Suzuki Shigetaka 
delivered to open the symposium was， athis own request， withdrawn prior 
to the publication of the proceedings. It was not to r国urfacein published 
form until1980.拘Asit stands， the program that Suzuki laid out seems to 
be highly valuable， but he apparently felt that it did not fit in with the gener-
al direction of the symposium. Since my focus is on the published proceed-
ings， 1 refer to his piece only briefly. 
As a historian， Suzuki understood overcoming modernity as the rejection 
of “historicism" and the idea of “progress." This is easy to argue 
philosophically， but quite another thing to demonstrate with the tools of 
historical research and description. Suzuki speaks from practical ex-
perience when he insists on the difficulty of such an undertaking. 1 had fre-
quent occasion to hear him speak when he was alive， and 1 am sure that 
this was a lifelong concern of his. 
Suzuki's“Memorandum" notes the need to c1arify just what it is that is 
supposed to be overcome:“Is it the nineteenth伺nturyor is it the Renais-
sance?" One cannot help feeling hぽethe influence of Christopher 
Dawson， who traced the mistakes of modernity to the Renaissance. In-
deed， inthe course of an exchange with Yoshimitsu， Suzuki remarks: 
The Renaissance was basically something born out of the Mid-
dle Ages in the sense that it was to reverse what the medievals 
had done. And here we come to a basic question. In spite of the 
fact that the beginnings of modernity can be traced objectively 
to the Middle Ages， the modern individuals subjectively hold 
the view that they started from the rejection of the Middle Ages 
and they think that they are right in doing so. 1 think that this is 
the dilemma of modernity. Do we not need to overcome this 
dilemma? There is something wrong with the spirit of the rejec-
tion of the Middle Ages， the spirit which is commonly shared 
by the modern individuals. Therefore， perhaps reflection on 
what we owe to the Middle Ages is . . . .oneway to overcome 
modernity.37) 
Nishitani， a philosopher of the Kyoto school， to which Suzuki also be-
longed， played in this symposium a role as important剖 Suzuki's.Minamoto 
characterizes Nishitani's standpoint as follows: 
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The keynote of the thinkers of the Kyoto school， aspersons educated in the 
traditions of J apan and the East despite a1l血eyhave learned from the 
W田t，h田 beenthe attempt to bring the possibilities latent in traditional cul幽
ture into encounter with Western culture. With this in mind， we may look 
more c10sely at the contribution of Nishitani Keiji to the symposium. 
Nishitani's brief but well-structured contribution to the symposium，“My 
Idea of the Overcoming of Modernity，" suggests that Japan's adoption of 
European culture is characterized by the importation of disparate elements 
with litle or no connection to each other. This contrasts with the introduc-
tion of Chinese culture in ancient times， which was done more organically. 
Part of the blame lies with Japan's picking and choosing things from the 
West with no concern for relationships among them， but a more fundamen-
talre邸onlies in the fact that Western culture itself had lost its sense of cul-
tural connectedness. 
According to Nishitani， Europe's modern age was a time血atsaw the crum-
bling of the foundations that had once made possible a unified view of the 
world. Specifically， he singled out three streams of thought in modern 
Western Europe: the Reformation， the Renaissance， and the rise of the 
natural sciences. It is a mistake to see these as merely three tributaries flow-
ing from a single intellectual mainstream. They are in essence independent 
of each other and radically at odds with one another because ach holds wト
thin itself a completely different view of the world. 
Nishitani argues for the need to lay new foundations if we are to face the 
b田.icqu偲tionsof today and forge a new worldview. He pos白 theproblem
in terms of religion: 
What kind of religiosity will give culture， history， ethics， and so 
forth， alof which are based on a complete affirmation of the 
human， the freedom to pursue their own standpoint， while at 
the same time insuring equal freedom of activity for the 
sciences， whose standpoint is one of indifference to the human， 
and then to unify the two standpoints? 
The answ民 forhim， lies in“the construction of佃 ethicsbased on 
religion." This standpoint of religiosity， which can be discovered only by 
“probing into our own subjectivity，" he ca1ls “the standpoint of subjec-
tive mothingness.' '38) 
Minamoto discusses on Nishitani's interpretation of Ranke as follows: 
The term moralische Energie， taken over from the German historian 
Ranke， was a byword in the in the social thought of the Kyoto school， but 
Nishitani's use of the term was somewhat different in that he expanded it to 
cover not only the ethics of the people or the nation but a “world ethic." If 
it is only a J apanese ethic， 
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it has no connection to the ethics of the world， and in certain 
circumstances can be linked to injustices like making other peo-
ples and objects of colonization. It can be put at the service of 
the persona1 grudges of a nation，部 itwere. In our country 
today the moral energy that is the driving force of national 
ethics must at the same time directly energize a world ethic.39) 
We must not forget that in speaking of the actual problems that arose once 
the war was underway， Nishitani's aim was a world ethic that went beyond 
the nationa11evel and he warned against colonization. This sets him apart 
from collaborators who fanned enthusiasm for the war among the 
people.相}
More detailed reference to Ranke is made in a series of three other symposi-
ums:“World-historical standpoint and J apan， "“Morality and historicity of 
the East-Asian Co-prosperity Sphere，" and “The Philosophy of total war." 
J oining in this series of symposiums were exclusively four scholars of the 
“Kyoto school，" Koy田na，Kosaka， Nishitani， and Suzuki. This series was pub-
lished in March 1943 with the title “Sekai-shi teki tachiba to Nippon" (World-
historical Standpoint and Japan).41) In the first symposium “World-historical 
standpoint and Japan"， Kδyama said that the root cause of the defeat of 
France in June 1941 was lack of what Ranke called “moralische Energie" 
(mor叫energy).The victory of Germany meant according to Koyama the victo.幽
ry ofGerman “moral energy."叫 Kosakaargued that the leading nation in the 
turbulent era had to be equipped not only with military and economic power， 
but also with “moral energy.' '43) Nishitani explained in the second symposium 
“Morality and historicity of the East-Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" that 
Japan's leading role in the East-Asian Co-prosperity Sphere depends on 
Japan's“mor叫 energy."44) On the other hand， Suzuki contended that the 
science of world history today had to be based on an active consciousness to 
create a new world. According to him， Ranke's concept of world history was 
not only narrow in scope， but too meditative and contemplative， and therefore 
Ranke's consciousness of world history could not be revived as the science of 
world history today.45) In spite of Suzuki's critical treatment of Ranke's world 
history， Ranke's word “moral energy" was very frequent1y quoted in this 
series of symposiums. It was a key concept used to vindicate Japan's war poli-
cy. The four professors ofthe Kyoto school were， without doubt， intellectually 
very highly qualified scholars. Nevertheless， we find among them a tendency， 
though with some reservations， to suppo此 Japan'swar aims. And Ranke 
offered to them the arguments to buttress up their insistences. After Japan's 
defeat in 1945， althe four professors were purged from Kyoto University by 
the order of General MacArthur. 46) 
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Here we can see that Ranke， inspite of his contemplative attitude to polit-
ics， especially to the unification of Germany， had in himself political or crypto-
political elements such as his emphasis on “moral energy." His contemplative 
attitude toward German unification was vehement1y attacked by the historians 
ofthe “Prussian school." For Ranke， the pentarchic system of five powers， 
Prussia， Austria， England， France， and Russia， asestablished by Metternich in 
the Viennese system of 1815， was entirely satisfactory. In this respect， he was 
not chauvinistic enough for the German cause， and was criticized by Droysen 
and Treitschke. The crypto・politicalelement Ranke cherished later bloomed in 
Japan in the Second World War， and came to be highly estimated， orperhaps 
overestimated， bythe “Kyoto school" of Japanese philosophers. 
Ranke had various aspects within himself. He was contemplative and 
meditative， tobe sure， inhis view of history. At the same time， he was叫so
deeply religious. He established an “objective" method of studying source 
materials. But he was not totally a-political. His theory of“moral energy" 
shows that he worshipped and sanctified the states， perhaps not necessarily the 
German nation-state， but European states in general. We have traced how 
Ranke was accepted in the United States and in Japan. It was in Japan， that 
Ranke's two aspects， objectivist and crypto・political，were accepted separate-
ly， and that Ranke's“state-worship"47) was stressed to the ful extent. 
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PART TWO: The Problem of Narrativity and Traditional Japanese Hiostor-
ical Writings: Introductory Oral Remarks to the Session on “Fictionality， 
Narrativity， Objectivity (History and Literature， Historical Objectivity)" at 
the 18th Internationa1 Congress of Historica1 Sciences (Montrea1， Canada， 
31 August 1995) 
In considering the issue of our session:“Fictionality， Narrativity， Objectivi-
ty"， the three volume work of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur gives us 
va1uable hints. Ricoeur begins his work with the ana1ysis of the concept of time 
contained in Saint Augustine's Confessions and of the concept of emplotment 
(muthos in Greek) contained in Aristot1e's Poetics. His basic hypothesis is that 
“between the activity of narrating a story and the temporal character of hu-
m如 experiencethere exists a correlation that is not merely accidenta1 but that 
presents a transcultura1 form of necessity.' '48) Ricoeur formulates his hypothe-
sis in another way and says that “time becomes human to the extent that it is ar-
ticulated through a narrative mode. and narrative attains itsfull meaning when 
it becomes a conc，ψtion 01 temporal existence，"49) 
Thus， according to Ricoeur， narrative and time， narrativity and temporalト
ty are closely co-related. Two classes of narrative discourse， namely historical 
narrative and fictional narrative， history and literary fiction， are， according to 
him， also co-related. He says that between the referential modes of historical 
and fictiona1 narrative there exists “the undeniable assymmetry."SO)“Only 
history can claim a reference inscribed in empirica1 reality"， he asserts.S1) He 
caI1s this method of history the “reference through traces". And he says that 
the metaphorica1 reference is common to every poetic work and that the refer-
ence through traces and the metaphorical reference borrow each other. He 
asks “where do the reference by traces and the metaphorical reference inter-
weave if not through the temporality of human action?'九andsuggests that it 
is“human time that history and literary fiction in common refigure， by this in-
terweaving of their referential modes. "52) 
In the chapter “The Eclipse of Narrative"， Ricoeur follows how the issue 
of time and narrative is treated by the French historians of the Anna1es schoo1. 
As regards this school， itscriticism of the history of events is well-known and 
this criticism is taken， Ricoeur says，“as equiva1ent to the rejection of the cate-
gory ‘narrative' ."53) Ricoeur spares a lot of pages to ana1yse the work of the 
French historian Fernand Braudel The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean 
World in the Age of Philip II， asthe “real manifesto of the Annales school.' '54) 
Ricoeur pays much attention to Braudel's series of plural time-spans， s 
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the terms “quasi-events" and “quasi-plots，" Ricoeur concludes that“the 
plurality of historical times extolled by Braudel is an expansion of the cardinal 
feature of narrative time， namely its ability to combine in variable proportions 
the achronological component of the configuration. "56) 
In the chapter “Defenses of N町rative"， Ricoeur follows the theories devel-
oped by those whom he calls “narrativists"， beginning with the American 
phi1osopher Arthur C. Danto. Ricoeur concisely summarizes the theory of the 
“Ide叫 Chronicle"，or “full description" ，57) invented by Danto， asfollows: 
Danto's ingenious idea is to approach the theory of narrative sentences by 
way of a detour: criticism of the prejudice that the past is determined， 
fixed， eternally standing stil in its being， while the future is open and unde-
cided (in the sense of Aristotle's and the Stoics'‘future congencies'). This 
presupposition rests upon the hypothesis that events fal into a receptacle 
where they accumulate without being able to be altered; neither their ord釘
ofappe町ancecan be changed， nor can anything be added to the住content，
except by adding to what follows them. A complete description of an event 
should therefore register everything that happened，泊theorder in which it 
happened. But who could do such a thing? Only an Ideal Chronicler could 
be such an absolutely faithful witness and absolutely sure about this entire“ 
ly determined past. This Ideal Chronicler would be gifted with the faculty 
of being able to give an instantaneous transcription of whatever happens， 
augmenting his testimony in a purely additive and culminative way as 
events are added to events. In relation to this ideal of a complete and defini-
tive description， the historian's task would be merely to eIiminate false sen-
tences， toreestabIish any upset in the order of true sentenses， and to add 
whatever is lacking in his testimony. 58) 
The Japanese philosopher Kamikawa Masahiko considers， according to 
the suggestion of A. M. Maclver， such an Ideal Chronicle written by the Ideal 
Chronicler， assituated on the level of generalization zero.59) It goes without 
saying that every statement in history is to some extent an abstraction omitting 
and ignoring many details， and insofar it is not an Ideal Chronile， which is im-
possible to attain by human efforts. Kamikawa calls this abstraction， accord-
ing to Maclver， generalization. 80， the wor1d of history lies， according to 
Kamikawa， between the lowest level of “generalization zero" ， which is equiva-
lent to“individualization infinity"， and the highest level of “generalization in-
finity"， which is equivalent to“individualization zero.' '60) 
Let me return to Ricoeur's analysis of the “Narrativists." Ricoeur， after 
overviewing the researches by the “Narrativists，" Danto， W. B. Gallie， Louis 
O. Mink， Hayden White， and Paul Veyne， concludes that“the narrativists 
have successfully demonstrated that to narrate is already to explain" and that 
from this basic thesis emerges a number of corollaries. He says that if“every 
narrative brings about a causal connection merely by reason of the operation 
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of emplotment， this construction is already a victory over simple chronology 
and makes possible the distinction between history and chronology.' '61) 
1 think that this distinction between chronology and history is meaningful. 
The Polish historian J erzy Topolski proposed a trio of the concepts of time cor-
responding to Annal， Chronicle， and History in his report in the methodologi-
cal session on “Concepts of Time in Historical Writings in Europe and Asia" 
in the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Madrid in 1990. He iden-
tifies three kinds of dated time， namely， annalist's time， chronicler's time， and 
historian's time. According to Topolski， the annalist， inthe sense of an ideal 
annalist， does not go back in recording an event into its past nor go forward to 
its consequences. The chronicler， inthe sense as an ideal chronic1er， imparts to 
the past of an event he records the form of a real narrative. The historian， also 
in the sense of an ideal historian， has both a retrospective and a prospective 
view.62) 
The American historian Hayden White identifies what he calls “three basic 
historical representations"， that is to say， the annals， the chronic1e， and the 
history proper， using the concept of narrativity as a measure.63) He explains as 
follows: 
While annals represent historical reality as if real events did not display the 
form of story， the chronicler represents it as if real events appeared to hu-
man consciousness in the form of unfinished stories. And the oficial wis-
dom has it that however objective a historian might be in his reporting of 
events， however judicious he has been in his assessment of evidence， 
however punctilious he has been in his dating of res gestae， his account 
remains something les than a proper history if he has failed to give to reali-
ty the form of a story.伺
As this quotation shows， there must be a story in history and therefore 
there must be a plot in history， insists White. White has in common with 
Ricoeur the emphasis on plot and emplotment in history. 
At this point 1 would like to take into account the history of J apanese 
historical writings in the Middle Age. Specifically， 1would like to take up three 
most representative works. These are Okagami， or The Great Mirror， written 
presumably about 1086 A.D.， Gukanshδ， orThe Future and the Past， written 
by the priest Jien (1155-1225) in 1219， and the JinnδShδtδki， orThe Chroni-
cles of the Correct Succession of Deities and Sovereigns (or A Chronicle of 
Gods and Sovereigns)， written by Kitabatake Chikafusa (1293-1354) presuma-
bly in 1339 A.D. 
The first book， The Great Mirror， iscomposed of a mixture of且ctionand 
history. A History of Japanese Literature by Konishi Ken'ichi， characterizes 
The Great Mirror as a book of factual history which “traces the history of the 
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history of the Fujiwara regency at the highest of its power， describes Fujiwara 
Michinaga's life of luxury in the most glowing terms. Despite the hyperbole， 
however， there are never any contradictions between fact and style in The 
Great Mirror."的 HelenCraig McCullough， who translated it into English 
with a detai1edintroduction， characterizes The Great Mirror as follows: 
The book can be viewed as an account of the rise of an aristocratic fami1y， 
the Fujiwar丸 fromits seventh-αntury inception to its zenith in the career 
of its most conspicuously successful member， Michinaga (966・1027)，who 
dominated the Court from 995 unti1 his death， acting for many years as 
principal minister， and wielding de facto power， through marital and fami-
ly connections， asthe father-in-law of three Emperors， one Crown Prince， 
and one Retired Emperor; the grandfather of an Emperor and a Crown 
Prince; and the father of a Regent. Furthermore， our author's main spokes-
man， an old raconteur called Yotsugi， whose name itself can be taken to 
mean chronicle， says to his audience， 'Pay c10se attention， everyone . 
You should think， asyou listen to me， that you are hearing the Chronicles 
0/ Japan.'伺
And the whole history begins as follows: 
It happened recently that 1 attended an enlightenment sermon at the Uri-
n'in， where 1 witnessed an encounter between three people of extraordina-
ry and disturbing antiquityー twograybeards and a crone， who had， it
seemed， satdown in the same place by chance. How strange that such a trio 
should have come together! As 1 stared， they laughed and exchanged 
glances. 
‘For years now， 1 have been wanting to meet someone from the old 
days with whom to discuss what has been going on in the world， and espe-
cialy to talk about the fortunes of our present Novice Excellency 
(Fujiwara Michinaga)，' one of the old men said.‘This happy meeting 
reconci1es me to the thought of dying. A person feels stuffed when he can't 
get things off his chest. No wonder the man of old dug a hole and talked 
into it when he had a piece of news to pass along. It's delightful to see you. 
Tell me， what is your age?'67) 
It comes out soon that the old man is Oyake no Yotsugi and is 190 years 
old. The other old man who was asked of his age is Natsuyama Shigeki and is 
180 years old. The older man Yotsugi said: 
‘1 have only one thing of importance on my mind，' he went on，‘and that is 
to describe Lord Michinaga's unprecedented successes to al of you here， 
clergy and laity of both sexes. It is a complicated subject， so1 shall have to 
discuss a fair number of Emperors， Empresses， ministers of state， and 
senior nobles first. Then when 1 reach Michinaga himself， the most for-
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tunate of al， you wil understand just how everything came about . . . . '68)
Yotsugi begins the Imperial Annals with the accession of Emperor Mon-
toku in 850 A.D. The highlight of Yotsugi's ta1e isthe life of Michinaga and 
the history of the Fujiwara Family preceding Michinaga. When the old people 
ended ta1king， they suddenly disappeared.69) 
1 reported about the second historical work Gukanshδin detail in my 
“General Comments on the Concepts of Historical Time" for the 
methodologicalession on “Concepts of Time" in the Internationa1 Congress 
of Historical Sciences in Madrid in 1990.70) So 1 will confine myself to repeat 
that the author Jien had the intention to stress that “dδ-ri"， tobe translated as 
Principle， orReason in the meaning of the German word Vernunft， was run-
ning through the whole history of Japan. 
Jien's Principle was very much elastic. Jien says: 
Ever since the beginning of the J apanese state， Principles have been created 
to replace Principles-and politicallife has changed ーinthis way because 
there has been continuous deterioration in the abilities (kiryδ) and fortunes 
(kahδ) of rulers and ministers.71l 
In contrast to The Great Mirror， Jien's Gukanshδhad lit1e fictiona1 narra圃
tive， and was far more philosophical. If we are allowed to apply the term plot 
and the like to three historical works of Medieval Japan， we may say that the 
plot of The Great Mirror was to show how the preponderance of the Fujiwara 
family came about， and the Gukansho was emplotted to show how the Princi-
ples were functioning throughout the Japanese history. Jien's Principle is 
almost identical with the rule of the Emperors assisted by self-controlled nobili-
ty， with the Fujiwara family as its representative one. 1 quote here the im-
portant part of the introduction of the English version: 
The special character of the Gukanshδ's historical interpretation is firmly 
rooted in Jien's belief that the course of Japanese history had been， and 
would continue to be， determined by divine imperatives called Principles 
(d，δri)， a word used throughout his study of history and also in prayers， 
poems， and leters written by him during those troublesome years before 
the Shδky色War(1221 A.DふNotingthe importance of these Principles to 
the Gukanshδview of history， and reading Jien's statements that‘al 
phenomena are affected by Principles' and ‘nothing lies outside the bounds 
of Principles，' early readers referred to his work as a Tale of Principles 
(dori no monogatari). Although Jien made a point of writing ‘so that even 
the unlearned would be able to understand' how Principles interacted with 
each other， headmitted that only a few persons of ability (kiryδ) would be 
able to see just how the interaction was driving events of Japanese history 
-15-
along one definite course. It is therefore not surprising that modern histori-
ans， Japanese and non-Japanese， have had di田cultycomprehending either 
the essential meaning of Principles or the general pattern of their interac・
tion. 
The Gukanshδinterpretation is structured by two types of Principles， 
pulling the course of human affairs in opposite directions: destructive ones 
that account for a continuing process of deterioration _over time， and con-
町 uctingones that make it possible for ‘understanding' leaders to achieve 
partia1 and tempor紅yimprovement. Principles of the first type， pr'回sing
evぽythingtoward extinction， arise from an acceptance of the old Hindu be-
lief that the world is now passing through the deteriorating ha1f of a small 
kalpa and that everyting will continue to deteriorate until this ha1f comes 
to an end， thousands of years hence. 1n Jien's day， Buddhism itself was be-
lieved to have entered a third and final age of decay: the age of Final Law 
(mappδ)， which was thought to have begun in A.D. 1052 and to be des-
tined to end only when this deteriorating ha1f of the present ka1pa has run 
its course. Deeply influenced by Fina1 Law belief， Jien outlines seven 
periods of Japanese history (Chapter 5)組 dexplains that each period， 
govemed by itw own destructive Principle， isanother stage of progressive 
decay. 
Principles of the constructive type， on the other hand， include Shinto 
and Buddhist Principles which， ifunderstood and adjusted to， have the 
power to negate kalpic decline， temporarily and partially. Jien identifies 
several Buddhist Principles of this type: the Principle of ‘destroying evi1 
and creating good，' the Principle of 'hindering evil and maintaining good，' 
and Principles associated with 'blessing of expediency' bestowed upon the 
Japanese people by various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Blessings-of-ex-
pediency Principles occupy an especially加portantplace in Jien's view of 
the past，部 isdisclosed in his discussion of four important historica1 
figures who， asBuddhist incarnations， bestowed ‘blessings' upon Japan at 
times of significant improvement. Commenting on such-blessings， he says: 
‘Alas， ifal Emperors and ministers had believed deeply in those “ex-
pedient blessings" and given some thought to the true course of Principles， 
not deviating one iota from them， 1 think that the “time fate" of deteriora四
tion from the beginning to the end of the first half of the present small 
Kitabatake Chikafusa was also of the similar opinion to Jien's about the 
Emperors and the nobi1ty. But it must be noted that he wrote Jinnd Shδtdki， 
A Chronicle 01 Gods and Sovereigns， toshow that the Imperia1line of the Em-
peror Godaigo， towhom he remained loya1 until his death in 1354 A.D.， was 
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the only legitimate one of the correct succession. ln those days of the Age of 
Northern and Southern Dynasties (1336-1392)， two dynasties existed. These 
were the Northern Dynasty in Kyoto and the Southern Dynasty of the Em-
peror Godaigo in Yoshino. These two dynasties were denying the legitimacy of 
one another. This age of schism is an exeptional and controversial period in 
the history of J apan. The issue which of these dynasties had legitimacy was ve-
hement1y disputed in the House of Representatives in Japan as late as 1911. A 
Chronicle 01 Gods and Sovereigns was emplotted very clearly to demonstrate 
that the Southern Dynasty had the legitimacy to claim the lmperial succession， 
the origin of which derives from the remote mythical age of Japan. 
H. Paul Varley， who translated Jinno Shδtδki into English with a detailed 
introduction， writes in the beginning of the introduction as follows: 
Few works of history have enjoyed greater fame and popularity in the 
Japanese tradition than Kitabatake Chikafusa's Jinnd Shδtδki (ChronicIe 
of the Direct Descent of Gods and Sovereigns). One reason for this is that， 
in contrast to most Japanese historical writing before the Tokugawa period 
(1600-1868)， JinnδShδtδki is aIso a polemical tract whose author deaIt for-
thrightly， even though often dogmaticalIy， with major issues in sociaI and 
poIitical afairs. Another reason is that the last section of JinnδShδtδki is 
a firsthand account of one of the most controversial events in pre-modern 
Japanese history， the dynastic schism within the imperial family that led to 
a protracted period of war between two rival courts from 1336 untill392. 
Chikafusa himself was a leading figure in the first half of this war. 
But by far the most important reason for the fame and popularity of 
刀nnδShotδkiover the centuries is that its basic theme is the history of the 
imperial succession. To many later generations of Japanese， even up to 
World War 1， Jinnd Shδtδki was the great catechism for loyalty to the 
throne. AIthough the kind of loyalty that had its classical expression in 
Jinno Shδtδki was historicalIy discredited by Japan's defeat in the war， 
Chikafusa's work remains a historical record of major importance. It is es-
sentiaI reading for alI who wish to inquire into the history of the Japanese 
imperiaI institution.73) 
Kitabatake Chikafusa wrote in the last part of his book as follows: 
In the winter of 1338， inthe old capital of Kyoto， the era name was 
changed to Ryakuo. But since at the court of Yoshino the era designation 
of Engen was retained， the provinces came to use whichever they wished. 
Although this sort of thing was common in China， it had never occurred be-
fore in J apan. This is the fourth year since removal of the court to Yoshino 
in the province of Yamato with its ancient imperiaI associations. Inasmuch 
as the sacred mirror and jewels are at Yoshino， how can it be regarded as 
other than the imperial capita11 
Sometime about the sixteenth day of the eighth month， 1 heard， Em-
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peror Godaigo became il and died. 1 realized there was nothing unusual 
about this in a world which is like a dream one has when sleeping. Stil， 1 
could not check the flow of my aged tears as there passed before my ey出
the many recollections of my relationship with His Majesty. Even my brush 
could move no more. It is said that in ancient times in China 'Confucius 
put his brush down after teling about the capt町 eof the lin，' and s加盟町ly
1 would like to have put my brush down too. But since 1 wished to state the 
true principle渇concerningthe direct line of gods and sovereigns and to 
make clear my own views about them， 1 forced myself to write on.74) 
1 am not prepared to go deeper into the problem of objectivity now. So 1 
would like to refer only to what the German sociologist Georg Simmel once 
pointed out pertinently. Simmel wrote in his work Das Problem der 
Geschicht.伊hilosophie(The Problem of the Philosophy of History) published 
in 1892， that it is important to do away with what he calls “naive realism" or 
“rea1ism of cognition." Such rea1ism of cognition， which had explained that 
the truth had been the co・incidenceof thinking and the outer object has been 
done away with in the natura1 sciences long ago. The expression of the re叫
events through the mathematic formulas， etc. is composed by the categories of 
the human spirit. It is not a copy which totally coincides with the subject. In 
historical research， however， itis stil believed that the cognitive subject can 
copy the subject like a mirror and the task of historical research is believed to 
lie in portraying the event， as“they had really been" (wie es wirklich gewesen 
ist)， Simmel says. According to Simmel any cognition is without exception the 
translation of given data into a new language， and besides according to the 
forms， categori白 andrequests proper to this language，7S) Simmel's insistence 
becom凶 easilyunderstandable to us by the hypothesis of Idea1 Chronicle posit-
ed by Danto and supported by Kamikawa. 
Kamikawa also criticizes Ricoeur and says that in the realm of “life-world" 
we are acting and arranging things in the process of time and so we can express 
our acts only through narrative. Narrative is a text in which various things are 
arranged within a context in the process of time and so temporarity is an in-
dispensable moment in the narrative. Kamikawa moreover says that we must 
start from an ana1ysis of the ho出 onof“life柳田ld"and not from the estab-
lished historica1 or fictiona1 narratives， asRicoeur does.明
Pursui喝therelation between fictiona1ity， narrativity， and objectivity， we 
have travelled a long way from Aristot1e in ancient Greece and Augustine in 
the later Roman Empire， through the Middle Age of Japan and then to the dai-
ly life in the ‘“‘lif白e.明 orld"¥.Now 1 s叫tophere. 
1 heartily wish that this short report has thrown some light on the subject of 
our seSSlOn. 
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